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Abstract 
We incorporate the possibility of eradicating infectious diseases through partial vaccinations into a static model where 
each individual incurs a cost, which differs among the individuals, when he/she is administered a vaccine. We show 
that if an infectious disease is eradicated by vaccinating up to the individual whose vaccination cost is lower than a 
threshold, then the partial compulsory vaccination program is strictly preferable to the free choice vaccination program 
in terms of social welfare otherwise, the free choice vaccination program is strictly preferable to the partial compulsory 
vaccination program. Our result is a generalization of Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991).
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     1 Introduction
Following the eradication of smallpox by mass vaccination in 1980, public health agencies
are implementing global vaccination programs against other infectious diseases such as polio,
measles, and tuberculosis. Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991) modeled the problem
faced by the public health agencies as a static model in which each individual incurs a cost,
which diﬀers among individuals, when he/she is administered a vaccine, that provides perfect
immunity against the disease. They obtained a result to the eﬀect that the full compulsory
vaccination, which requires that all individuals should be vaccinated, is strictly dominated by
free choice vaccination in terms of social welfare.1 Ever since Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator
(1991), a large number of detailed studies have been conducted on the economic analysis of
vaccination against infectious diseases (see, for example, Francis (1997), Barrett (2003), Kremer
(1996), and Geoﬀard and Philipson (1997)).
Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991) did not incorporate an epidemiologically important
factor known as herd immunity: the entire population does not have to be immunized in order
to eradicate the infectious disease. That is, the presence of a suﬃcient number of immune
individuals in a population leads to the eradication of the disease. Anderson and May (1991)
explains that if some individuals in the population were already immune due to vaccination,
then the spread of the infection is interrupted when the infected individuals contact an immune
rather than a susceptible individual. Therefore, a number of susceptibles will be indirectly
protected from infection simply because some others are immune. In fact, Anderson and May
(1991) state that the fact that for smallpox “a vaccination coverage around 70-80 percent is
suﬃcient for the eventual eradication ... may help explain the success of global eradication
program.” Actually, as shown in Table 1 according to Anderson and May (1991), the estimated
overall levels of vaccination coverage required for eradication are strictly less than 100 percent.
We incorporate the possibility of eradication through not full but partial vaccination cover-
age into the model of Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991). Then, we extend the compulsory
vaccination program to deal with the eradication through partial vaccination coverage, which
compels some of individuals to be vaccinated up to the eradication of the infectious disease.
Then, we obtain a result that there is a threshold level of the vaccination cost: if the infectious
disease can be eradicated by vaccinating up to the individual whose vaccination cost is lower
than the threshold, then the partial compulsory vaccination program is strictly preferable to
the free choice vaccination program in terms of social welfare, whereas if the infectious dis-
ease cannot be eradicated by vaccinating up to the threshold, then the free choice vaccination
program is strictly preferable to the partial compulsory vaccination program.
The contribution of this paper is as follows. First, it provides the public health agencies a
criterion for judging whether vaccination against an infectious disease should be compulsory or
laissez-faire: if epidemiological researches indicate that the infectious disease can be eradicated
with vaccination coverage less than the threshold, then the agencies should undertake com-
pulsory vaccination; otherwise, the vaccination decision should be devolved to each individual.
The result of this paper means that it is not always the case that the free choice vaccination
program is preferable to the compulsory vaccination program without any reservation, as Brito,
Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991).
Second, the result of this paper is a generalization of Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator
(1991). That is, in the extreme case that the infectious disease can be eradicated only if all
1They also show that both vaccination programs are not Pareto optimal.
1individuals are vaccinated, our setting is reduced to theirs. Hence, their result can be interpreted
as a corollary of ours.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the epidemiological model that de-
scribes the manner in which eradication is achieved. Section 3 describes the economic model and
introduces two vaccination programs. Section 4 presents our proposition. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 Partial Vaccination
The basic reproductive rate R0 is the central concept of mathematical epidemiology. Following
Anderson and May (1991), R0 is deﬁned as the average number of secondary infections produced
when one infected individual is introduced into a population comprising totally susceptible
individuals. Since all individuals are susceptible, the infectious disease in this population would
be transmitted to R0 susceptibles per each infected individual. For the disease to spread, it is
required that R0 > 1.
However, in the presence of vaccination programs, the populations are not “totally sus-
ceptible”; some individuals are immunized by vaccination. We assume that the vaccination is
completely eﬀective. Let  2 [0;1] be the ratio of the vaccinated individuals to the popula-
tion. The infected individual does not transmit the infectious disease to immunized individuals
Therefore, the “actual” average number of secondary infections produced when one infected
individual is introduced into the population, referred to as the eﬀective reproductive rate R, is
given by discounting the basic reproductive rate R0 by the ratio of the unvaccinated individuals
to the population 1   :
R = (1   )  R0: (1)
R indicates that a single infected individual actually transmits the disease to only R individuals
and not to R0 individuals. Equation (1) provides us an important implication: we are able to
eradicate the infectious disease if we achieve a suﬃciently high  that reduces the eﬀective
reproductive rate R below unity. e is the critical ratio of vaccinated individuals required to
achieve eradication; brieﬂy, it is the eradication ratio,




If  is higher than e, then we have R < 1 from equation (1), which implies that there will
be less than one secondary infection per infected individual, as a result of which the infectious
disease will be eradicated. This implies that it is not necessary to vaccinate every individual in
order to eradicate the disease, that is, e < 1.
For example, if the basic reproductive rate of an infectious disease is ﬁve, then we have







Hence, only 80 percent of the population needs to be immunized in order to eradicate the
infectious disease. Since the value of R0 varies with the infectious disease, e also varies.
p is the probability of a given unvaccinated individual becoming infected; brieﬂy, it is the
probability of being infected. As assumed by Anderson and May (1991), we have
p =
{
  R0  (e   ) for all  < e;
0 otherwise; (4)
2where  is a parameter.2 As long as  < e, the value of p is strictly decreasing in . Once
the vaccination coverage reaches the eradication ratio e, the probability of being infected is
eliminated.
3 The Model
Our model is based on that of Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991). The primary diﬀerence
is that the utility of each individual does not depend on his/her income in this paper because
we do not treat income distribution aspects. We use their notation to the maximum extent.
We consider an economy with a continuum of individuals whose total number is normalized
to unity. u is the utility of a healthy individual, and u is that of an infected individual. We
assume that u > u. Each individual is identical except for his/her vaccination cost  2 [0; ¯ ],
where ¯  > 0. Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991) interpret the vaccination cost  as
an individual characteristic that is relevant only if the individual is vaccinated: the diﬀerent
individuals face diﬀerent prices of being vaccinated or diﬀerent probabilities of suﬀering side
eﬀects, which is measured in terms of time or pain. The vaccination cost  is distributed
from the cumulative distribution function F(), where F(0) = 0 and F(¯ ) = 1. The cumulative




In Section 2, we assumed that vaccination completely immunizes the recipient individual
against the infectious disease. Hence, when an individual with vaccination cost  is vaccinated,
his/her net utility is u . On the other hand, if the individual is not vaccinated, then he/she
will be infected with the infectious disease with a probability of being infected p(), which is
obtained in Section 2. Hence, his/her expected utility of being unvaccinated is given by
v()  [1   p()]u + p()u: (5)
The expected utility of being unvaccinated, v(), exhibits
@v
@




since u > u and
@p
@  0. Note that for any value of  higher than eradication ratio e, the
expected utility of being unvaccinated is equal to the utility of the healthy individual, i.e.,
v() = u, since p() = 0 for any  > e.
3.1 Vaccination Programs
This study focuses on the following two vaccination programs.
The ﬁrst vaccination program is referred to as the free choice vaccination program, wherein
all individuals are free to choose whether or not to be vaccinated. We assume that  is exoge-
nously given for all individuals. An individual with vaccination cost  2 [0; ¯ ] decides to be
vaccinated if and only if the utility of being vaccinated exceeds the expected utility of being
unvaccinated:
u    > v(): (7)
2In Anderson and May (1991),  represents the natural mortality rate. However, it can be eliminated since
it plays no role in this paper.
3Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991) found that the free choice vaccination program pos-
sesses a unique interior equilibrium: there exists a unique individual whose vaccination cost is
 2 (0; ¯ ) such that any individual with a vaccination cost less than  chooses to be vacci-
nated, whereas any individual with a vaccination cost more than  chooses to be unvaccinated,
and that the ratio of the vaccinated individuals to the population  is consistent with each indi-
vidual’s vaccination decision. We refer to  as the free choice solution. The free choice solution




where () = F() — the ratio of the individuals whose vaccination cost is equal to or strictly
less than . We assume that the infectious disease is not eradicated under the free choice
vaccination program, or equivalently, () < e. This contribution of Brito, Sheshinski, and
Intriligator (1991) is summarized as follows.
Result 1. (Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991)). There exists a unique interior solution
 2 (0; ¯ ) where the ratio of the vaccinated individuals to the population, (), is consistent




Proof of Result 1 is in Appendix.
The second vaccination program is referred to as the partial compulsory vaccination program,
which compels e ratio of individuals to be vaccinated in the order of lowest vaccination cost.
The implementation of this vaccination program leads to the eradication of the disease. Under
the partial compulsory vaccination program, any individual whose vaccination cost is less than




f(z)dz = e: (10)
We refer to e as the partial compulsory solution. Since e < 1, we have e < ¯ . Moreover, e
is an exogenous parameter since the eradication ratio e is exogenously given. Note that this
program provides us the lowest total vaccination costs for vaccinating e ratio of individuals.
4 Comparison of the Vaccination Programs
Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991) showed that the free choice vaccination program does
not attain the maximum of social welfare. Hence, it is inevitable to ascertain which of the
two vaccination programs is more desirable. We deﬁne social welfare in terms of utilitarianism.
Let W() be the social welfare under the free choice vaccination program with . Under this
program, any individual whose vaccination cost is lower than  is vaccinated, while the rest





[u   z]dF(z) + v((
))  (1   F(
)): (11)
4On the other hand, under the partial compulsory vaccination program with e 2 (0; ¯ ), any
individual whose vaccination cost is lower than e is vaccinated, while the rest are unvaccinated.
In addition, the infectious disease is eradicated. Let ¯ W(e) be the social welfare under the




[u   z]dF(z) + u  (1   F(e)): (12)
Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There is a unique interior threshold level of the vaccination cost ˆ  2 (; ¯ )
such that (i) if the partial compulsory solution e is above the threshold ˆ , then the free choice
solution is strictly preferable to the partial compulsory solution, and (ii) if the partial compulsory
solution e is below the threshold ˆ , then the partial compulsory solution is preferable to the free
choice solution. That is, there exists ˆ  2 (; ¯ ) such that
(i) for any e > ˆ , we have W() > ¯ W(e),
(ii) for any e < ˆ , we have W() < ¯ W(e).
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the level of social welfare at the partial compulsory solution
with e = ¯ :
¯ W(¯ ) =
∫  
0
[u   z]dF(z); (13)
which is strictly lower than the social welfare at the free choice solution since
W(
)   ¯ W(¯ ) =
∫ 
0












))   u + z]dF(z) > 0: (14)
The last inequality follows from v(())   u +  > 0 for all  >  and  < ¯ .









which is strictly higher than the social welfare at the free choice solution since
W(






















))   u]dF(z) < 0:
The last inequality follows from the fact that v(()) is a convex combination of u and u, and
u > u. Moreover, it easily follows that
@ ¯ W
@e
=  uef(e) < 0; (17)
5which ensures that there exists a unique interior ˆ  2 (; ¯ ) satisfying
¯ W(ˆ ) = W(
): (18)

This proposition indicates that there is a threshold level of the vaccination cost ˆ  2 (; ¯ )
such that if the infectious disease cannot be eradicated by vaccinating up to the individual whose
vaccination cost is the threshold level ˆ , then the free choice vaccination program is preferable to
the partial compulsory vaccination program; whereas if the infectious disease can be eradicated
by vaccinating up to the individual whose vaccination cost is less than the threshold, the partial
compulsory vaccination program is preferable to the free choice vaccination program. Note that
the threshold ˆ  is strictly more than  and strictly less than ¯ .
Figure 1 illustrates the determination of the threshold level ˆ . The vaccination costs are
measured from the left edge of the graph. The net utility of being vaccinated is given by the
downward sloping curve labeled u   . The curve representing the expected utility of being
unvaccinated is upward sloping until it reaches u at  = e. Subsequently, it is constant at u
since there is no risk of infection for any   e. The free choice solution  is given at the
point at which both the curves intersect. The social welfare under the free choice vaccination
program consists of both the sum of the utility of the vaccinated individuals, given by the area
under the graph u    from 0 to , and that of the unvaccinated individuals, given by the
area (ab¯ ). On the other hand, the social welfare under the partial compulsory vaccination
program with e consists of both the sum of utility of the vaccinated individuals, given by the
area under the graph u  from 0 to e, and that of the unvaccinated individuals, given by the
area (cd¯ e). A comparison of the social welfares from both the vaccination programs is reduced
to a comparison of the lightly shaded triangular area and the darker rectangular area. If the
former is larger than the latter, then the free choice vaccination program is preferable to the
partial compulsory vaccination program; otherwise, the partial compulsory vaccination program
is preferable to the free choice vaccination program. The threshold level of the vaccination cost
ˆ  is obtained as the vaccination cost which equates the lightly shaded triangular area to the
darker rectangular area.
The main feature of this Proposition is that when the Pareto optimal vaccination level is
infeasible, it provides a criterion that helps the public health agencies to determine which vac-
cination program should be implemented — the free choice vaccination program or the partial
compulsory vaccination program. If the infectious disease can be eradicated by vaccinating up
to the individuals whose vaccination cost is lower than the threshold ˆ , then the agencies should
select the partial compulsory vaccination program; otherwise, they should select the free choice
vaccination program. This criterion is useful especially in the case that the Pareto optimal
vaccination level is infeasible.
Another feature is that we generalize the result of Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991).
In order to observe this, we consider the case where they make the following assumption re-
garding the infectious disease: the infectious disease is eradicated only if “all” the individuals in
the population are vaccinated, that is, e = 1, or equivalently, e = ¯ . In this case, the partial
compulsory vaccination program is reduced to the “full” compulsory vaccination program since
not partial but full segment of individuals has to be vaccinated to eradicate the disease. Since
the threshold level ˆ  is strictly less than the maximum vaccination cost ¯  from Proposition 1,
the free choice solution dominates the “full” compulsory solution in terms of social welfare. In
6other words, particularly in the case of e = ¯ , the public health agencies should select the free
choice vaccination program rather than the “full” compulsory vaccination program. This result
is same to that obtained by Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991). Therefore, their result
can be interpreted as a corollary of ours.
Corollary. (Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991)). If all individuals have to be vaccinated
to eradicate the infectious disease, i.e., e = ¯ , then the free choice vaccination program strictly
dominates the full compulsory vaccination program, i.e., W() > ¯ W(¯ ).
5 Conclusion
We have shown that if an infectious disease can be eradicated by vaccinating the ratio of the
population whose vaccination cost is less than a threshold, then the public health agencies
should vaccinate compulsorily up to the eradication of the infectious disease; otherwise, they
should provide each individual with the option to be vaccinated or not. This result hinges on
the incorporation of the epidemiological fact that the infectious disease can be eradicated by
covering only a segment of the population under the vaccination program. Therefore, studies
that ignore eradication by partial vaccination when estimating the impact of eradication by
compulsory vaccination tend to underestimate the social welfare resulting from compulsory
vaccination.
This is diﬀerent to the result of Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991), suggesting that
the advantage of the compulsory vaccination program is independent of the characteristics of
the infectious diseases. This independent property of the compulsory vaccination programs is
attractive for public health agencies that desire to implement vaccination programs because it
minimizes the information requirement. In fact, this independent property only holds under a
set of ideal conditions. When the independent property does not hold, further information is
required for implementing the vaccination program.
Finally, we mention an assumption on the partial vaccination program. The partial com-
pulsory vaccination program used in this paper compels individuals to be vaccinated in the
order of lowest vaccination cost. This implies that we implicitly assume that the public health
agencies possess information on the vaccination cost of each individual. However, if they do
not possess this information, then the individuals to be vaccinated are decided randomly, which
decreases the desirability of eradication by the partial compulsory vaccination.
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8Appendix
Proof of Result 1. (Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991)). For any given  2 [0; ¯ ], let
Ψ() be the diﬀerence between the utility of being vaccinated and the expected utility of being
unvaccinated:
Ψ()  u      v(()): (19)
Since @v






f < 0: (20)
A further assumption that when all the individuals are vaccinated, it is not worthwhile to be
vaccinated for an individual whose vaccination cost is extremely high: at the other extreme,
when no one is vaccinated, it is worthwhile to be vaccinated for an individual whose vaccination
cost is zero,
u   ¯  < v(1) and u > v(0); (21)
leads to the existence of a unique interior solution  2 (0; ¯ ), which satisﬁes
Ψ(
) = u   
   v((
)) = 0: (22)

9Table 1. Approximate estimates of the vaccination coverage (the degree
of herd immunity) required to eradicate a variety of viral, bacterial, and
protozoan infections in developed and developing countries.
Critical proportions of
Infectious disease the population to be
immunized for eradication
Malaria 99%
(P. falciparum in a hyperendemic region)
Measles 90-95%
Whooping cough (pertussis) 90-95%








Source: Anderson and May (1991), Table 5.1.
10θ∗ θe ¯ θ 0
u − θ
u
a
cd
b
v(π(θ))
Figure 1.
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